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ABSTRACT 
Social-ecological systems are often highly complex, making effective governance a considerable 
challenge. In large, heterogeneous systems, hierarchical institutional regimes may be efficient, but 
effective management outcomes are dependent on stakeholder support. This support is shaped by 
perceptions of legitimacy, which risks being undermined where resource users are not engaged in 
decision-making. Although legitimacy is demonstrably critical for effective governance, less is 
known about the factors contributing to stakeholders’ perceptions of legitimacy or how these 
perceptions are socially differentiated. We quantitatively assessed stakeholder perceptions of 
legitimacy (indicated by support for rules) and their contributory factors among 307 commercial 
fishers and tourism operators in Australia’s Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. Legitimacy was most 
strongly associated with trust in information from governing bodies, followed by confidence in 
institutional performance and the equity of management outcomes. Legitimacy differed both within 
and among resource user groups, which emphasizes the heterogeneous nature of commonly 
defined stakeholder groups. Overall, tourism operators perceived higher legitimacy than did 
commercial fishers, which was associated with higher trust in information from management 
agencies. For fishers, higher levels of trust were associated with: (1) engagement in fisheries that 
had high subsector cohesion and positive previous experiences of interactions with governing 
bodies; (2) location in areas with greater proximity to sources of knowledge, resources, and 
decision-making; and (3) engagement in a Reef Guardian program. These findings highlight the 
necessity of strategies and processes to build trust among all user groups in large social-ecological 
systems such as the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. Furthermore, the social differentiation of 
perceptions that were observed within user groups underscores the importance of targeted 
strategies to engage groups that may not be heard through traditional governance channels. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Protected areas are increasingly being implemented in efforts to achieve conservation goals, yet 
many fail to deliver the expected socioeconomic and environmental outcomes, often due to 
ineffective governance (Hughes 2011). Studies of long-enduring institutions for natural resource 
governance provide insights into the characteristics that contribute to success. These 
characteristics include small resource systems, homogeneous resource users, and locally devised 
rules (Ostrom 1990, Agrawal 2001). A shift to localized and inclusive institutions for governing 
resource use is therefore increasingly promoted, and expected benefits include increased 
democracy and accountability (Armitage et al. 2007, Berkes 2007, Cinner et al. 2012). While 
achieving positive effects in many cases, this shift is not a panacea for improving conservation 
outcomes (Evans et al. 2011, Gutiérrez et al. 2011, Cinner et al. 2012). Numerous difficulties 
remain, including successful engagement with heterogeneous communities and the development 
of effective fiscal, administrative, and democratic structures of responsibility and accountability, 
particularly in communities with limited capacity (Lane et al. 2004). 
Improving natural resource governance may be particularly challenging in large, complex social-
ecological systems. Design principles for managing common-pool resources have primarily been 
derived from studies of small-scale, self-organizing, or community-based systems (Armitage et al. 
2009). These principles may not apply as well in complex social-ecological systems that are large, 
such as those that span multiple catchments and contain significant resource user populations, or 
that are heterogeneous in terms of resource regimes and resource user diversity (Ostrom 2009). 
In such complex systems, where opportunities for collective rule-making by resource users may be 
limited or transaction costs may be high, governance structures can be both hierarchical and 
polycentric (Duit and Galaz 2008, Morrison 2014). At this larger scale, governance weaknesses can 
be amplified, especially if exclusion of resource users from decision-making means that poor 
support for management measures undermines legitimacy (Lane 2001, Schultz et al. 2011). 
Understanding the legitimacy of governance systems perceived by resource users in complex 
social-ecological systems is therefore critical for engendering support of, and compliance with, 
management measures (Sutinen and Kuperan 1999, Arias 2015). 
Legitimacy can be defined as the right of a governing body to rule and the recognition of this right 
among those being governed (Tyler 2006). Thus, legitimacy is derived from normative beliefs 
about who is entitled to rule, and how (Lockwood 2010). These beliefs are shaped by the structure 
and processes that define the governing body and are related to factors such as effectiveness, 
transparency, and inclusiveness (Levi et al. 2009, Scharpf 2009, Schmidt 2013). Insights from 
global environmental governance theory suggest that legitimate authority can be granted through 
the shared acceptance of an institutional regime among those governed (Bernstein 2004, 
Habermas 2010). Where legitimacy is not elicited through formal democratic processes, it can be 
earned through demonstrated commitment, integrity, and effectiveness in producing outcomes 
(Lockwood 2010). Research in criminology and psychology has demonstrated the importance of 
legitimacy for enhancing compliance with rules, which makes governance easier and more 
effective (Tyler 2006, 2010, Levi et al. 2009). To date, the factors that influence legitimacy are not 
well understood. Their inclusion in analyses of environmental governance, however, promises 
insights useful for developing more effective natural resource management strategies. 
Researchers have distinguished between value-based and behavioral legitimacy (e.g., Levi et al. 
2009). Value-based legitimacy refers to a willingness to obey rules, which can be legitimized 
through congruence with social norms and values (Bernstein 2004). Value-based legitimacy in turn 
may lead to a manifestation of these values through compliance, termed behavioral legitimacy. 
Factors contributing to value-based legitimacy include the trustworthiness of a governing body, 
and procedural and distributive justice (Levi et al. 2009, Hard et al. 2012; Fig. 1). Trustworthiness 
is determined by public perceptions of the performance and competence of the governing body. 
Trust therefore reflects the degree of confidence and goodwill directed toward governing 
institutions (Lai et al. 2010) and the information they share with stakeholders (Gilmour et al. 
2015). Trust has also proven to be vital for eliciting compliance in settings as diverse as the 
workplace (Kim and Mauborgne 1993), community-based management and comanagement of 
natural resources (Pretty 2003, Armitage et al. 2009), and tax compliance (Scholz and Lubell 
1998). Hence, we view trust as a key precondition of legitimacy within environmental governance 
contexts. 
Justice is another important precondition for legitimacy. Procedural justice, or procedural fairness, 
is a measure of how well a governing body enforces regulations and applies them equally to all. 
Legitimacy may be undermined if enforcement is perceived to be discriminatory, even if the rules 
are socially acceptable (Birnbaum 2016). Governing bodies can adhere to principles of distributive 
justice by considering the distribution of costs and benefits arising from management decisions, 
the claims of different groups, and providing justification or compensation when inequitable 
outcomes occur (Lockwood 2010). Legitimacy may be weakened if these principles are not 
evident. The link between justice and voluntary cooperation and compliance has been 
demonstrated in numerous studies and social dilemma experiments (De Cremer 2003, De Cremer 
and Tyler 2005). 
While the importance of legitimacy has been studied in a range of contexts, there remains limited 
understanding of the relative importance of factors that contribute to legitimacy, particularly in 
large, complex, natural resource governance systems. An improved understanding of factors such 
as trust and justice is important given the potential role of legitimacy in engendering voluntary 
compliance (Hønneland 1999, Shaw 2005). Furthermore, though perceptions of management 
measures and governance quality differ according to socio-demographic attributes and in different 
contexts (McClanahan et al. 2005a, Gelcich et al. 2009, Pita et al. 2010, Turner et al. 2014), few 
empirical studies of natural resource governance have explored how perceptions of legitimacy are 
socially differentiated within an institutional regime. This is a key research gap in complex social-
ecological systems, where resource user groups are large and heterogeneous. 
In this study, we investigate factors contributing to the legitimacy of the institutional regime for 
managing Australia’s Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (GBRMP). The Great Barrier Reef (GBR) is a 
complex social-ecological system and has the largest and most diverse coral reef ecosystem on 
Earth. The GBRMP encompasses multiple resource users, including local residents, commercial 
fishers, tourism operators, and tourists (Marshall et al. 2016). In this context, the current 
conceptualization of institutional design principles may have limited utility, given the large and 
heterogeneous group of resource users and the complex institutional regime with multiple layers 
and boundaries (Evans et al. 2014). The GBRMP is primarily governed by a single statutory body, 
the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA), and governance can be considered 
hierarchical (Day and Dobbs 2013). Understanding resource user perceptions that relate to 
legitimacy of this institutional regime are key to improving institutional fit and management 
success in this context. 
The GBRMP is used as a case study to explore the factors contributing to legitimacy among key 
direct resource users in the region: tourism operators and commercial fishers. These stakeholder 
groups represent important industries whose influence shapes policy and management (Olsson et 
al. 2008, Macintosh et al. 2010). Our specific objectives were: (1) to assess perceived legitimacy, 
indicated by the level of support for the rules of the GBRMP by these two direct resource user 
groups; (2) to assess factors contributing to legitimacy; and (3) to identify the characteristics of 
users who perceive weak legitimacy. This knowledge can help in designing institutional regimes 
that can engender greater legitimacy and support among resource users. 
METHODS 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
The GBRMP is located on the largest coral reef system in the world, which spans > 2000 km along 
Australia’s northeastern coast. As an environment of outstanding cultural and natural value, it was 
declared a World Heritage Site in 1981. Most of the World Heritage Site is encompassed within the 
multiple-use GBRMP designated in 1975, which uses an extensive zoning system to manage 
human activities (Day 2002). The latest rezoning process was implemented in 2004 and reflected 
broad environmental goals held by GBRMPA, including support for long-term interests such as 
fishing, tourism, and conservation. Although the rezoning is considered a successful example of 
protected area planning (Day and Dobbs 2013), it also created tensions between and within 
resource user groups (Macintosh et al. 2010). 
Tourism is the largest economic use of the GBRMP, generating approximately AUD$5.2 billion to 
the national economy and > 64,000 full-time jobs (Deloitte Access Economics 2013). Tourism is 
mostly nature based, relying on the reputation of the Great Barrier Reef as a unique and 
spectacular place that provides opportunities for diving, snorkelling, sailing, and recreational 
fishing. GBRMPA plays a regulatory role in tourism, for example, levying an environmental 
management charge and developing zoning, permits, and guidelines. 
Various types of fishing are permitted in > 60% of the GBRMP. Commercial fishing activities 
comprise line, trawl, net, pot, and harvest fisheries, which together contribute approximately 
AUD$122.9 million to the national economy and generate approximately 700 full-time jobs 
(Deloitte Access Economics 2013). Commercial fishers are typically highly dependent on fishing for 
their household income and have been in the industry for much of their working lives (Lédée et al. 
2012). The rezoning process encountered strong opposition from the commercial and recreational 
fishing sectors, leading to a significant structural adjustment package to compensate fishers 
(Macintosh et al. 2010). 
The GBRMP, like many large-scale protected areas, was established under a hierarchical 
governance tradition but is increasingly seeking to generate voluntary support among users. The 
institutional regime is complex and multilayered, with federal, state, and local agencies involved in 
various aspects of management (Day and Dobbs 2013). Although this formally constitutes a 
polycentric governance system, it has been described as highly centralized because most resource 
users are not directly involved in decision-making (Evans et al. 2014). Power is concentrated in 
the hands of a small number of management actors through a unifying agency and overarching 
legislation (GBRMP Act of 1975). However, GBRMPA governance includes comanagement 
arrangements with indigenous groups (Olsson et al. 2008, Nursey-Bray and Rist 2009). Recent 
efforts have also been directed toward inclusion of commercial stakeholders through schemes such 
as the Reef Guardian program, which encourages voluntary adoption of environmental standards 
by commercial users (e.g., fishers measure carbon emissions, report on reef health, and use 
modified gear to reduce environmental impacts; GBRMPA, Reef guardian 
fishers: http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/our-partners/reef-guardians/reef-guardian-fishers). While 
noteworthy, most governance decisions are still made by the GBRMPA, and the importance of 
engendering voluntary compliance in this context is recognized (GBRMPA 2014). This situation 
highlights the need to develop and maintain arrangements that engender legitimacy and support 
among resource users. The GBRMP thus provides an ideal opportunity to explore the role of 
legitimacy in the context of a well-established, hierarchical governance arrangement for a large 
and complex system. 
Data collection 
A social and ecological long-term monitoring program was established in 2011 to explore the 
status of different user groups and their interactions with the GBRMP. The program was funded by 
the National Environmental Research Program and led by the Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation. Questions were designed in collaboration with research and 
management agencies as well as stakeholder representatives to elicit perceptions, values, 
experiences, and attitudes relating to the reef and its management. Our study uses data from two 
telephone surveys conducted in 2013 targeting key resource user groups: commercial fishers and 
tourism operators. Databases of contacts were built using publicly available data, personal 
contacts, and unpublished data (Marshall et al. 2016). A total of 611 commercial fishers and 213 
tourism operators were identified via access to license databases for commercial fishers and 
internet searches for active tourism operators. A total of 329 interviews were conducted (210 
commercial fishers, 119 tourism operators), representing an estimated 34% of commercial fishers 
and 56% of tourism operators in the GBR region. 
Comparable questions were included in both surveys. Drawing on a conceptual framework (Fig. 1), 
we included four questions relating to legitimacy. The first question was designed to elicit 
respondents’ support for current rules and regulations in the GBRMP as an indicator of value-based 
legitimacy. We assume that support for rules is one indicator of social acceptance of the 
institutional regime and contributes to a willingness or sense of obligation to comply. This in turn is 
expected to contribute to behavioral legitimacy, or compliance, which was not measured here. 
Three further questions assessed factors considered to be preconditions for legitimacy: (1) 
confidence in the performance of governing institutions, (2) trust in information received from the 
GBRMPA, and (3) perceived fairness of access to GBR resources (Table 1). We assume that the 
first two factors reflect the trustworthiness of governing institutions, and the third factor reflects 
distributive justice (Fig. 1). Responses to all questions were measured using a 10-point ordinal 
scale reflecting agreement with specific statements (see Table 1). Such scales are commonly used 
to derive comparable data on perceptions across large populations (Bennett 2016) and were 
considered appropriate here given the scale of the GBRMP area. Further data were collected on 
respondent characteristics such as demographics, reef-use practices, location, dependence on 
reef-related income, and engagement with the GBRMPA. 
 
Fig. 1. Conceptual framework illustrating preconditions for legitimacy (adapted from Levi et al. 
2009). Dashed box indicates components not included in this study. 
Table 1. Dependent and explanatory variables derived from survey question statements. 
Responses to all question statements were measured using a 10-point ordinal scale (1 = very 
strongly disagree, 10 = very strongly agree). 
Variable Indicators measured Survey question  
Value-based legitimacy Support for management 
measures 
“I support the current rules and 
regulations that affect access and use 
of the GBR.” 
Factors contributing to 
legitimacy 
Governing body performance  “I feel confident the GBR is well 
managed.” 
 Trust in information from 
management agencies 
“I trust the information I receive 
about the GBR from GBRMPA.” 
 Distributive justice “I do not have fair access to the GBR 
compared to other user groups.” † 
† Scores for this question were reversed in analysis to derive a positively oriented scale 
comparable to other variables 
Data analysis 
Support for rules and regulations within both user groups was examined by visually comparing 
plots of responses using the Likert package in R (Bryer and Speerschneider 2013). A statistical 
modelling approach using a cumulative link model with a logit link was then used to investigate the 
relationship between the three factors expected to contribute to legitimacy and value-based 
legitimacy indicated by support for management measures. User type (commercial fisher or 
tourism operator) was also included in the initial model. Because of some nonresponses to survey 
questions relating to support for management measures (N = 4), governing body performance 
(N = 5), trust in information from the GBRMPA (N = 6), and distributive justice (N = 14), the 
model used a total of 307 complete records (195 commercial fishers, 112 tourism operators). 
Finally, based on results of the initial analysis, we identified trust in information from the GBRMPA 
to be an aspect of legitimacy that was particularly weak and variable among commercial fishers 
(Fig. 2). Thus, a cumulative link model with a logit link was used to investigate the characteristics 
of commercial fishers among whom trust in information from the GBRMPA was low. Characteristics 
investigated included those relating to demographics, fishing practices, location, economic 
dependence on fishing, and engagement in management activities (see Table A1.1 in Appendix 1). 
Variability in trust among tourism operators was not explored further because of their 
comparatively positive and homogeneous responses. 
RESULTS 
Support for rules and regulations 
In total, 50% of respondents agreed (score of 6–10) that they supported the rules and regulations 
in the GBRMP. The level of support for rules and regulations differed between the two user groups, 
with tourism operators more commonly expressing higher levels of support than commercial 
fishers (Fig. 2). Responses of fishers were more negative and varied across positive and negative 
scores (median = 5, interquartile range = 2–7) than were those of tourism operators (median = 8, 
interquartile range = 5–9). 
Tourism operators more commonly expressed agreement with all three statements reflecting 
factors contributing to legitimacy (Fig. 2). The majority of both user groups believed that access to 
the GBR was equitable, with 82% of tourism operators and 59% of commercial fishers agreeing 
that they had fair access to the GBR in comparison to other user groups. Confidence in the 
management of the GBR was weaker than the belief of fair access to the GBR, with 65% of tourism 
operators and 46% of commercial fishers agreeing that they were confident that the GBRMP is well 
managed. The largest difference in user group perceptions was in relation to trust in the 
information received from the GBRMPA, with 82% of tourism operators agreeing that they trusted 
information received from the GBRMPA compared to 29% of commercial fishers. One-third of 
fishers (34%) chose the category representing the strongest possible disagreement with this latter 
statement (score of 1). 
Legitimacy and its contributory factors 
Stepwise removal of explanatory variables to refine the ordinal regression model resulted in a final 
model retaining three explanatory variables, all of which had a positive effect on legitimacy (Table 
A1.2 in Appendix 1). Despite differences in legitimacy between commercial fishers and tourism 
operators (Fig. 2), perceptions of trust in information from the GBRMPA, governing body 
performance, and distributive justice were important predictors of legitimacy. Once these 
predictors were accounted for, user type was not a statistically significant explanatory variable and 
was removed from the model. 
Trust in information received from the GBRMPA exhibited the greatest effect size, followed by 
governing body performance and distributive justice (Table A1.2 in Appendix 1). The odds ratio 
indicates the odds of a unit increase or decrease in the explanatory variable being associated with 
a higher or lower value of the dependent variable. For example, for a one-unit increase in trust in 
information from the GBRMPA, the combined odds of the middle and high levels of support for 
rules and regulations (i.e., scores of 2–9) is 33 times greater than the lowest level (i.e., score of 
1), given that other variables in the model are held constant. 
 
 Fig. 2. Support for rules and regulations and indicators of perceived legitimacy by two key user 
groups of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. Shading represents the proportion of respondents 
choosing each score on a 10-point ordinal scale (1 = very strongly disagree, 10 = very strongly 
agree). GBR = Great Barrier Reef, GBRMPA = Great Barrier Marine Park Authority. 
Trust among commercial fishers 
Given the important role of trust in information from the GBRMPA in predicting legitimacy and the 
lack of trust identified among commercial fishers, we examined the characteristics of fishers that 
were associated with greater levels of trust. Stepwise removal of explanatory variables to refine 
the ordinal regression model resulted in a final model retaining three characteristics of fishers as 
explanatory variables: main fishery, natural resource management area of their home port, and 
reported participation in the Reef Guardian program (Table A1.3 in Appendix 1). 
Differences in the natural resource management area of fishers’ home ports showed some of the 
highest effect sizes. Fishers in the areas of Burdekin and Interstate were more likely to report trust 
in management agencies, whereas in the areas of Cape York and Burnett-Mary, only 12% and 
15% of fishers, respectively, agreed that they trusted information received from the GBRMPA (Fig. 
3). For main fishery type, greater trust in information from the GBRMPA was reported in particular 
among fishers in the harvest sector, with comparatively lower trust among those mainly engaged 
in line, net, pot, or trawl fishing (Fig. 3). Reported participation in the Reef Guardian program was 
associated with greater levels of trust in information from GBRMPA (Fig. 3). 
 
Fig. 3. Perceptions of trust in information from the Great Barrier Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) 
among commercial fishers in relation to characteristics of respondents. (A) Main gear type. (B) 
Participation in the Reef Guardian program. (C) Home port natural resource management area. 
Shading represents the proportion of respondents choosing each score on a 10-point ordinal scale 
(1 = very strongly disagree, 10 = very strongly agree). GBR = Great Barrier Reef. 
DISCUSSION 
Predictors of legitimacy 
Our findings demonstrate the relative importance of factors contributing to legitimacy of natural 
resource governance in a complex social-ecological system. Consistent with frameworks describing 
the preconditions for legitimacy, trust in information received, perceived competence of governing 
bodies, and perceived fairness were all important predictors of legitimacy. Trust in information 
from the GBRMPA was particularly important, affirming research that describes positive 
relationships between citizens’ perceptions of government trustworthiness and their acceptance of 
government authority (Scholz and Lubell 1998, Stern 2008, Levi et al. 2009). In a natural resource 
management context, trust in information from different sources has been identified as a key 
influence in determining the types of knowledge that are incorporated into stakeholders’ decision-
making processes (Gilmour et al. 2015). Trust is also widely recognized as critical to successful 
comanagement of natural resources because it helps build effective collaborative relationships and 
minimizes transaction costs (Pretty 2003, Armitage et al. 2007). 
Perceived legitimacy also increased with greater confidence in governing body performance. This 
confidence can reflect not only resource users’ appraisals that institutions are motivated to serve 
those governed, but also that the institutions will deliver on their promises (Levi et al. 2012). 
Resource users’ recognition of authorities’ commitment, efforts, and integrity in working toward 
their objectives can enhance earned legitimacy (Lockwood 2010). Confidence in governing 
institutions has also been linked to voluntary compliance (Cook et al. 2005), which is critical for 
effective natural resource management and conservation (Arias 2015). 
Though procedural and distributive justice are increasingly recognized as critical aspects of 
legitimate management (Lockwood 2010, Hard et al. 2012), our results indicate that distributive 
justice was the least influential of the three indicators. The positive influence of fairness on 
legitimacy is consistent with frameworks highlighting principles of effective governance for natural 
resources (Graham et al. 2003, Lockwood 2010). However, the greater effect of trust in our model 
in comparison to justice may result from the close relationship between these two concepts (Tyler 
2010), which we chose to treat as distinct aspects of the institutional regime in accordance with 
other recent studies (Tyler and Huo 2002, Levi et al. 2009). Alternatively, in complex social-
ecological systems it may be difficult for individuals to determine whether distributional justice has 
occurred; accordingly, the importance of trust in a governing body may be given more weight. 
Differing levels of legitimacy among resource user groups 
Differing perceptions of the legitimacy of the GBRMP institutional regime between and within user 
groups is consistent with previous studies of resource user perceptions of management and 
governance (McClanahan et al. 2005b, Gelcich et al. 2009, Velez et al. 2014). Higher support and 
greater homogeneity of responses among tourism operators compared to fishers may indicate that 
the values of tourism operators are more aligned with the perspectives of conservation-minded 
natural resource managers (Hoelting et al. 2013). Tourism operators’ activities are largely 
nonextractive and are unlikely to be affected negatively by zoning arrangements that prohibit 
various fishing activities. In addition, in large-scale systems where direct participation of all 
stakeholders is less feasible than in smaller systems, organized interests may be better 
represented in governance systems (Suškevičs 2012). Tourism operators may be more centrally 
located, organized, and easier to contact than fishers, resulting in greater potential for interaction 
with governing institutions and opportunities to build trust. For example, the GBRMPA issues 
permits directly to tourism operators and maintains regular contact through collection of passenger 
levies. 
In contrast, fishers are often poorly organized and represented. For example, the primary 
representative group, the Queensland Seafood Industry Association (covering the GBR, southeast 
Queensland, and the Gulf of Carpentaria) had 231 members at the time of our survey, although 
there were > 560 active fishing businesses in the GBR alone (Tobin et al. 2014). Furthermore, 
administration of commercial fishers takes place primarily through state fisheries agencies rather 
than through the GBRMPA. Commercial fishers are also often driven by a strong sense of 
individualism and have disparate goals and values (Marshall 2007, Pita et al. 2013), which can 
make engagement in governance more difficult. Lack of trust in the GBRMPA may also be 
associated with many commercial fishers’ perception that they were treated unfairly during the last 
GBRMP rezoning process (Lédée et al. 2012). 
Differing levels of trust among fishers 
Heterogeneity in the perceptions of commercial fishers was exemplified in the diversity of 
responses surrounding trust in information from the GBRMPA. Trust was differentiated strongly by 
main fishery type, reflecting the likely formation of cohesive groups within resource user sectors as 
a result of their shared working history and experience. It is common for cohesive groups to form 
based on common types of fishing undertaken (Crona and Bodin 2006). The harvest fishery, a 
small subsector dominated by the marine aquarium supply industry, stood out from the other 
subsectors as having high levels of trust in information from the GBRMPA. This group has a history 
of working together proactively, demonstrated by their development of a climate change 
vulnerability assessment (Donnelly 2011) and a stewardship action plan (Donnelly 2013), both of 
which were produced in partnership with research and management organizations. Experience of 
positive collaboration between fishers and management agencies is likely to lead to higher levels 
of trust between different actors (Davenport et al. 2007, de Vos and van Tatenhove 2011). 
After accounting for main fishery type, trust among fishers was also differentiated by region. 
Regions with higher trust (Burdekin, Fitzroy, Far North Queensland, and Mackay-Whitsunday) 
tended to have greater access to research and learning centers, as well as to GBRMPA offices, than 
did those with lower levels of trust (i.e., Cape York and Burnett-Mary). The Burdekin region 
exhibited the highest levels of trust and also contains the GBRMPA head office. In contrast, the 
Cape York region, which reported the lowest levels of trust, does not have a GBRMPA office and is 
remote from centers of power. Thus, these results may be explained by the increased 
opportunities for positive interactions with governing bodies afforded by proximity to an 
organizational office (Davenport et al. 2007, de Vos and van Tatenhove 2011). The presence of 
centers conducting relevant research may also increase the perceived relevance of information 
provided by management agencies, thereby enhancing institutional capacity to engender trust in 
the quality of information (Robins and Dovers 2007). Finally, the Burdekin region also differed 
from other regions in that it was the only region to develop successfully a comanagement 
committee, the Burdekin Sustainable Fisheries Alliance (GBRMPA 2011). 
Fishers who reported participation in the Reef Guardian program also reported higher trust in 
information received from the GBRMPA than did nonparticipants, irrespective of their main fishery 
type and region. Engagement in this program may improve relationships between fishers and the 
GBRMPA through interactions that build trust. However, it is uncertain if the Reef Guardian 
program recruited fishers who were already engaged and proactive in environmental stewardship, 
and if so, what the benefits might be for developing relationships between the GBRMPA and the 
broader fishing community. Interestingly, more fishers reported participation in the scheme than 
are formally involved (17 were officially listed as Reef Guardians at the time of survey, yet 52 
survey respondents claimed to be involved; Tobin et al. 2014). This finding might suggest that: 
(1) there was confusion about what the program was, (2) fishers consider themselves reef 
stewards even if they are not formally involved in the program (Tobin et al. 2014), or (3) there 
was a social desirability bias leading fishers to report falsely participation in the program. 
Nevertheless, the significant effect of this variable in predicting legitimacy suggests that fishers 
reporting to be part of the Reef Guardian program did have a higher sense of legitimacy than 
those who did not. 
Limitations of the research 
Perceptions of legitimacy among resource users may be shaped by factors not explicitly considered 
in our conceptual framework. The survey method that we used was appropriate for identifying 
broad stakeholder perceptions and exploring how these might influence governance. Future 
studies, however, would benefit from qualitative research in the form of detailed in-depth 
interviews and focus groups aimed specifically at understanding the wide range of variables that 
affect stakeholder beliefs and attitudes toward governance. For example, good governance 
principles such as accountability and inclusiveness reflect people’s opportunities to engage with 
governance systems and can influence whether people endorse institutional regimes (Lockwood 
2010). However, many elements of good governance are interrelated and were reflected in the 
findings through the characteristics and perceptions of different resource user groups. 
The data used to reflect components of the conceptual framework may also have influenced our 
findings. We used support for rules and regulations as a measure of value-based legitimacy, which 
refers to a sense of willingness or obligation to comply with rules (Levi et al. 2009). However, 
willingness to comply may exist even where support for rules is lacking. If individuals perceive 
governing bodies to be competent and fair, they may feel obliged to comply with rules that they do 
not support or by which they are negatively affected. For example, Barents Sea fishers complained 
about specific regulations but expressed a moral commitment to comply based on positive 
perceptions about inclusion of their views, representation, and fair enforcement (Hønneland 2000). 
Such viewpoints would reflect a form of legitimacy that would not be captured here. Value-based 
legitimacy may therefore be higher than our findings suggest. 
Our analysis did not include the behavioral legitimacy component of the conceptual framework that 
we drew upon; thus, we cannot empirically explore the extent to which value-based legitimacy 
might influence compliance with rules. Though legitimacy is likely to be an important factor 
influencing decisions about compliance, this relationship is not necessarily linear (Arias et al. 
2015). For example, where acceptability of rules is low, compliance may be high because of a fear 
of sanctions (Birnbaum 2016). Furthermore, resource users may exhibit stewardship over natural 
resources, even if they do not support regulations. For example, fishers in the GBR held positive 
attitudes toward marine conservation, but support for the rezoning plan was lacking because of 
perceptions relating to inadequate engagement in the process and negative effects on their 
businesses (Lédée et al. 2012). To understand better the implications of differing perceptions of 
legitimacy for natural resource management, future research should further consider how value-
based legitimacy may influence voluntary compliance and stewardship. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our study underlines two key implications for effective natural resource management. First, the 
findings demonstrate the particular importance of trust as a prerequisite for legitimacy in a large, 
complex, social-ecological system. High levels of trust in governing bodies are crucial in 
determining stakeholders’ perceived legitimacy of management decisions, which, if high, may 
increase voluntary compliance and decrease transactional costs associated with cooperation 
between different actors (Pretty 2003). Natural resource governance should therefore be 
conducted in a manner that fosters trust between stakeholders and managers (Scharpf 2009, 
Schmidt 2013), yet trust and legitimacy are created and manifested differently in different 
governance systems. In large social-ecological systems that are not conducive to resource users 
being closely connected or interacting often with governing bodies, deliberate strategies may be 
particularly important for building trust. 
Second, social differentiation of trust in the GBRMPA highlights a need for strategies targeted 
toward particular groups and contexts to build trust. Our results highlight the heterogeneous 
nature of commercial fishers, who are often considered in engagement strategies as a single 
homogeneous group. Governing bodies may need to devise strategies targeted toward groups 
around which fishers organize or coalesce such as fishery type or region. Further attempts to 
understand and increase stakeholder perceptions of legitimacy in natural resource governance will 
also benefit from systematic and periodic monitoring of legitimacy indicators such as trust, as this 
enables managers to detect changes in specific areas or stakeholder groups (Cundill and Fabricius 
2010, Turner et al. 2014). This process may be particularly critical in hierarchical or polycentric 
governance arrangements in which resource managers may interact infrequently with resource 
users. Overall, higher levels of trust seem to be correlated with subsector cohesion, positive 
previous experiences, and proximity to sources of knowledge, resources, and decision-making. 
While governing bodies can manipulate access to decision-making and distance to power (e.g., 
through public participation and setting up regional offices in remote regions) to enhance trust and 
legitimacy, many of these correlates are deeply historical and cannot be engineered quickly or 
undertaken in a tokenistic fashion (Putnam et al. 1993, Morrison 2007). Genuine efforts to develop 
trust will require continued interaction and commitment (Armitage et al. 2009). 
Although there is continued demand for improved governance of protected areas, the factors that 
contribute to increased legitimacy in large, complex systems are not well understood. Our study 
provides insights on natural resource governance by identifying the relative importance of these 
factors in the GBRMP. Our findings confirm that trust, justice, and governance competence are 
common ingredients for both small- and large-scale social-ecological systems, yet the 
characteristics of large and complex systems may exacerbate the challenges of achieving these 
preconditions for legitimacy, particularly where resource users are numerous and diverse. Our 
study demonstrates heterogeneous perceptions of resource users in the GBR context, which 
complicates engagement and governance strategies that view user groups as homogeneous 
entities. Although hierarchical institutional regimes may facilitate efficiency and control to achieve 
positive environmental outcomes (Evans et al. 2014), it may be more difficult to enable 
participation and build trust in these settings. Where resource user perceptions of legitimacy are 
low, institutional regimes should consider targeted engagement efforts and perhaps greater 
institutional diversity. Accordingly, metagovernance strategies could be used to shape institutional 
regimes in ways that establish conditions enabling meaningful engagement with numerous and 
diverse stakeholder groups (Morrison 2014). Such strategies can establish the broader governance 
conditions that foster networked self-organization, social capital, and the self-regulation of 
industries, and potentially enable a shift away from utilitarian consultation methods and toward a 
path of more genuine participation and stewardship. 
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Table A1.1. Characteristics of commercial fishers measured in the survey 
Fisher 
characteristic  
Indicator 
measured 
Description Data type 
Demographics    
 Age Age of fisher Interval 
 Education Respondent has university or other higher 
education 
Categorical (Y/N) 
 Family Whether family members are involved in fishing Categorical (Y/N) 
Fishing 
practices 
   
 Employees   Number of employees Interval 
 Owner/operator Licence owner, operator, or owner-operator Categorical 
 Years fishing Number of years fishing experience Interval 
 Days fishing Number of days fishing in past 12 months Interval 
 Distance 
travelled 
Typical distance travelled from home port Categorical 
 Multiple ports Whether respondent uses multiple ports Categorical (Y/N) 
 Fishery types          Number of different fisheries involved in Interval 
 Main fishery                 Main fishery the respondent is involved in Categorical (Line, 
Net, Pot, Trawl, 
Harvest) 
 Multiple vessels     Whether respondent operates multiple vessels Categorical (Y/N) 
Location    
 Home port NRM Natural Resource Management (NRM) area in 
which respondents home port is located 
Categorical 
Dependence    
 Fishing income Proportion of household income from fishing Interval 
 GBR income Proportion of fishing income derived from the GBR Interval 
Engagement    
 Research  Respondent is involved in research or 
management 
Categorical (Y/N) 
 Reef Guardian Participant in GBRMPA’s Reef Guardian programme Categorical (Y/N) 
 
 
Table A1.2. Cumulative link model estimates of resource users’ (n=307) perceived legitimacy and 
retained explanatory variables. Log likelihood: - 571.44, condition number of Hessian: 180 
Explanatory variable Estimate SE z 
value 
Pr(>|z|) Odds 
ratio 
95% CI 
(lower) 
95% CI 
(upper) 
Governing body 
performance 
2.873 0.495 5.801 <0.001 17.698   6.703   46.724 
Distributive justice 1.122 0.355 -3.161   0.002 3.071   1.532  6.158 
Trust in information from 
management agencies 
3.504 0.540 6.489 <0.001 33.242 11.535   95.792 
 
  
Table A1.3. Cumulative link model estimates of fishers’ (n=191) trust in information from 
GBRMPA and retained explanatory variables reflecting respondent characteristics. Log likelihood: -
348.44, condition number of Hessian: 1.6e+03, AIC: 736.88 
Explanatory 
variable 
Category Estimate SE z 
value 
Pr(>|z|) Odds 
ratio 
95% CI 
(lower) 
95% CI 
(upper) 
Main fishery         
 Pot            0.075 0.450 0.166 0.868 1.08 0.45 2.60 
 Net            0.612 0.484 1.266 0.206 1.84 0.71 4.76 
 Line           0.981 0.418 2.349 0.019 2.67 1.18 6.04 
 Harvest          1.754 0.532 3.296 <0.001 5.78 2.04 16.40 
Home port 
NRM area 
        
 Cape York      0.571 0.763 0.748 0.455 1.77 0.40 7.90 
 Terrain FNQ    0.577 0.527 1.096 0.273 1.78 0.63 5.00 
 Burnett-Mary   0.853 0.607 1.405 0.160 2.35 0.71 7.72 
 Fitzroy        0.988 0.548 1.804 0.071 2.69 0.92 7.86 
 Burdekin   1.587 0.561 2.827 0.005 4.89 1.63 14.70 
 Intrastate      1.938 0.617 3.138 0.002 6.94 2.07 23.29 
Reef 
Guardian 
        
 Yes 1.355 0.312 4.344 <0.001 3.88 2.10 7.15 
 
 
